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“ALL GOOD THINGS FLOW . . . ”: RULE OF LAW, PUBLIC 
GOODS, AND THE DIVIDED AMERICAN METROPOLIS 
James J. Kelly, Jr.∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 This essay is a review of and a response to Urban Decay, Austerity, and Rule 
of Law, an article written by Brent White, Simone Sepe, and Saura Masconale. 
Building upon an intuitively compelling social contract theory insight, the article 
sets out the theoretical and empirical cases for the authors’ contention that 
sustained investment in highly visible, essential local public goods provides crucial 
support for rule of law. White, Sepe, and Masconale offer their theory as a “make 
‘gov’ not war” alternative to the Broken Windows Theory, which underlies 
order-maintenance policing strategies. In the final section of the piece, the authors 
employ this Urban Decay Theory (UDT) to argue that the federal and state 
governments should fund substantial fiscal guarantees of municipal governments’ 
capacities to provide urban infrastructure. 
In this invited response, Professor Kelly welcomes the article’s 
introduction of the rule of law paradigm to domestic urban policy, finds fault 
with its selection of public goods that purportedly influence rule of law, and 
contends that the UDT has far greater potential than the poor support it can 
offer the authors’ flawed policy proposal. By conceptualizing the domestic 
urban policy goal as rule of law rather than order, the authors open 
measurements of success to go beyond crime rates and majoritarian 
perceptions of personal safety. Without losing the groundedness necessary for 
empirical investigation, rule of law can incorporate ideal aspects of lawful 
order that address sustainability and inclusion of minority perceptions of 
legitimacy. While the article does not succeed in constructing as compelling an 
understanding of the most salient public goods, an improved analysis of the 
root causes of the fiscal degradation of America’s legacy cities can unlock a 
potentially valuable reframing of urban, metropolitan, and regional policy 
debates.  
 
 ∗ Clinical Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I would like to thank Nicole Garnett, Nestor 
Davidson and Dan Kelly for their encouragement, comments and suggestions. I am also grateful for the 
responses I received after sharing an earlier version of this essay with Brent White, Simone Sepe, and Saura 
Masconale. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As he rallied his fellow citizens to defend the exceptionally open society 
that was Athens, Pericles spoke of the city’s commitments to democracy, 
social equality, tolerance, and rule of law as key features that set it apart from 
Sparta, its militaristic enemy in the Peloponnesian War. All these he connected 
to the Athenians’ achievement of prosperity through free exchange more so 
than by conquest: “Then the greatness of our city brings it about that all the 
good things from all over the world flow in to us.”1 Pericles died in an 
epidemic early on in that war, a war that Athens ultimately lost.2 But, 
modern-day proponents of openness and transparency in political and 
economic institutions have championed classical Athenian ideals around the 
globe. Rule of law continues to hold its place in the development advocacy 
platform next to democracy and free markets as the cornerstones of sustainable 
progress. 
Brent White, Simone Sepe, and Saura Masconale, in their article, Urban 
Decay, Austerity and Rule of Law (Urban Decay),3 bring the concept of rule of 
law back home to the cities of the developed world, specifically those of the 
United States. The authors contend that investment in public goods provides 
crucial support for rule of law.4 This ambitious piece covers a broad spectrum 
of legal and political analysis, moving in turn from conceptual framework to 
game theory hypothesis formation to complex empirical analysis. It ends by 
advocating for increased financial support of cities by federal and state 
government. 
The article begins with its most important contribution: the application of 
social contract theory to the pursuit of an urban environment that is safe and 
sound for all. Much of the legal literature discussing urban public safety and 
city residents’ perceptions of safety have focused on order as the posited goal. 
White, Sepe, and Masconale reconceptualize this key objective as the 
flourishing of the rule of law, which “stands at the heart of the social contract, 
whereby individuals voluntarily unite into civil society and agree to be subject 
 
 1 THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 146 (Rex Warner trans., Penguin Books 1954) 
(c. 431 B.C.E.). 
 2 See id. at 163. 
 3 Brent T. White, Simone M. Sepe & Saura Masconale, Urban Decay, Austerity, and the Rule of Law, 
64 EMORY L.J. 1 (2014). 
 4 Id. at 9–32. 
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to that society’s laws in exchange for social order.”5 Citizens’ faith in that 
constructive bargain, the authors claim, depends on their confidence in the 
government itself, as the delegate of the cooperating community.6 The local 
failure of government to provide public goods to its citizens signals that the 
health of the overall social contract is not particularly strong.7 Using game 
theory analysis, the article shows why rational actors are more likely to make 
the necessary sacrifices to abide by rules if they perceive that others are doing 
so as well.8 A community’s investment in public goods, the authors 
hypothesize, can predict the extent to which rule of law obtains in that 
community.9 
They then test this hypothesis using data sets collected from countries 
around the world. As an indicator of the strength of public goods and citizen 
perceptions of their quality, the authors combine objective traffic death data 
compiled by the World Health Organization and Gallup poll data measuring 
resident satisfaction with urban infrastructure.10 To quantify the vitality of rule 
of law, the analysis uses the Corruption Perceptions Index, a poll of business 
people regarding the prevalence of bribery and other corrupt governmental 
practices in their home countries.11 They employ complex and still more 
complex regressions to establish a correlation between the public goods index 
and the rule of law index.12 The second set of statistical operations is designed 
to show that public goods investment specifically and uniquely predicts rule of 
law rather than the other way around.13 
Having set forth the empirical case for the connection between investment 
in highly visible public goods and rule of law, White, Sepe, and Masconale 
outline their own policy prescription for saving cities such as Detroit. Earlier in 
the piece, they set their own account of urban decay against that of the Broken 
Windows Theory (BWT), which has been the basis for much of the urban 
public safety scholarship that has championed order-maintenance policing. 
Where the BWT stresses the importance of visible signs of disorder, both 
 
 5 Id. at 5 (footnote omitted). 
 6 Id. at 14. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 14–17. 
 9 Id. at 14. 
 10 Id. at 33–34. 
 11 Id. at 34–36. 
 12 Id. at 37–43. 
 13 Id. at 39–43. 
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physical and social, as signals of acquiescence in the face of rule breaking, the 
Urban Decay Theory (UDT), as I will refer to it throughout this essay, 
proposed by White, Sepe, and Masconale, highlights governmental 
effectiveness in delivering public goods as a barometer for a social contract 
constantly being monitored by its constituents. BWT has been increasingly 
presented as the rationale for vigilant enforcement activity by police against 
low-level criminal activity in urban areas.14 The authors urge federal and 
especially state policymakers interested in inspiring greater rule abidance in 
urban areas to focus on shoring up the desperate finances of the municipal 
governments that provide the public goods infrastructure that shapes so many 
residents’ perceptions of their environment. Specifically, they call for a fiscal 
guarantee at the state and federal levels that would ensure sustained investment 
in urban infrastructure.15 
In this essay, I will focus my response on the conceptual and policy 
sections of the Urban Decay article.16 First, I will explore the significance of 
rule of law as a paradigm that incorporates at least some normative elements 
and the possibilities it offers over and above social order as a core urban policy 
goal. Next, I will examine the taxonomic challenges presented by the 
formulation of the causal connection’s other half: the set of public goods that 
the authors group under the heading of “urban infrastructure.” This part of the 
conceptual appraisal will discuss not only the diversity of relevant public 
goods but also the variety of both the providers and the means of funding the 
public goods and services they supply. The authors’ failure to explore the ways 
in which various public goods are paid for by those who use them is 
particularly problematic given that the state of urban infrastructure signals 
“government’s ability to continuously coordinate individual contributions to 
such goods.”17 After brief comments on the data and the statistical analysis, 
this essay will conclude by examining the largely unfulfilled policy potential 
for the UDT approach. 
Any disappointment expressed in the final section largely relates back to 
the need for greater attention at the theoretical level to relevant differences in 
 
 14 E.g., RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI WITH KEN KURSON, LEADERSHIP 47 (2002); Nicole Stelle Garnett, 
Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2004). 
 15 White et al., supra note 3, at 55–58. 
 16 I will give only brief comments, from a lay perspective, on the authors’ empirical evidence. See infra 
notes 65–71 and accompanying text. 
 17 Id. at 14. 
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public goods and to difficult fiscal questions, the latter of which are not 
eliminated by proposals to centralize funding responsibility for urban public 
goods. Urban Decay’s account of inner city decline also suffers from an 
omission all too common to domestic urban policy analyses that are grounded 
in predictions and data about the aggregated choices of rational actors: the lack 
of any discussion of how segregation based on class and race have shaped 
metropolitan areas in the United States. In the end, however, the need for a 
more sophisticated discussion of the deplorable state of urban public goods and 
how they got that way speaks to this ambitious article’s accomplishments 
rather than any shortcomings it may have. The authors’ reframing of the first 
step toward the flourishing of urban life as a more broad-based support for rule 
of law, rather than for mere pacification of the would-be unruly, allows crucial 
questions of legitimacy and the experiences of minorities to be explored and 
measured alongside the more dominant subjects of institutional efficiency and 
majority preference. This groundbreaking article opens the door for new 
research programs and richer discussion rather than succeeds so completely as 
to make those future inquiries superfluous. 
I. CONCEPTUAL PROGRESS 
A. Rule of Law 
Rule of law has been a focal point of scholarship and policy analysis 
concerning the development of legal structures, particularly those of countries 
located outside of Western Europe and North America.18 Citing an address 
President Clinton made to the United Nations more than twenty years ago, 
Maxwell Chibundu referred to “‘[d]emocracy,’ the ‘free market,’ and the ‘rule 
of law’ . . . as a trinity that underpin liberal capitalism.”19 Rule of law is touted 
as a prerequisite to functioning markets, protection of minority interests, 
 
 18 See Peter Boettke & J. Robert Subrick, Rule of Law, Development, and Human Capabilities, 10 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 109 (2003); Stephen Knack & Paul J. Zak, Building Trust: Public Policy, Interpersonal Trust, 
and Economic Development, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 91 (2003); David P. Stewart, Private International Law, 
the Rule of Law, and Economic Development, 56 VILL. L. REV. 607 (2011); Tor Krever, Note, The Legal Turn 
in Late Development Theory: The Rule of Law and the World Bank’s Development Model, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
287 (2011). 
 19 Maxwell O. Chibundu, Globalizing the Rule of Law: Some Thoughts at and on the Periphery, 7 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 79, 79 (1999) (citing President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks to the 48th Session 
of the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 27, 1993), available at http://www.state.gov/p/io/ 
potusunga/207375.htm). 
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development of public institutions and greater social capital in general.20 
White, Sepe, and Masconale concur with a number of authors who have 
observed a lack of consensus as to its meaning.21 But, a core list of its 
components includes a government that is open, accountable and not degraded 
by corruption; effective protection of citizens’ rights to safety and security and 
of their other fundamental liberties; and a system for resolving disputes and 
responding to injustices that applies rules consistently and impartially.22 
Rule of law, however, has not been a guiding concept in the discussion of 
either urban policy or state and local government law in the United States. 
Apart from the occasional rhetorical flourish applying human rights standards 
to domestic matters,23 rule of law is rarely explored in connection with the 
United States’ legal system. Scholars of links between crime rates and social 
disorder in American cities have instead devoted attention to the achievement 
of order in urban areas.24 Police practices regarding low-level crimes have 
been their primary if not exclusive focus.25 Citing the BWT as a foundational 
idea, scholars, police officials and politicians promoting a 
“sweat-the-small-stuff” approach to detention and arrest procedures have taken 
credit for significant and sustained drops in crime, especially in New York.26 
 
 20 See, e.g., Boettke & Subrick, supra note 18, at 112–13; Knack & Zak, supra note 18, at 107. 
 21 White et al., supra note 3, at 9–10 & nn.30–31. 
 22 See, e.g., What is the Rule of Law?, WORLD JUST. PROJECT, http://worldjusticeproject.org/what-rule-
law. An ABA-commissioned white paper provides the following definition: “a rules-based system of 
self-government that includes a strong and accessible legal system featuring an independent bar and judiciary.” 
THEO J. ANGELIS & JONATHAN H. HARRISON, HISTORY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE RULE OF LAW 4 (2003), 
http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/history_and_importance_of_the_rule_of_law.pdf. 
 23 See, e.g., Bill Richardson, A New Human Rights Agenda for the United States: New Realism, Human 
Rights, and the Rule of Law, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 5 (2008). 
 24 See NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, POLICING, AND THE RESTORATION OF 
URBAN AMERICA (2010); WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN 
AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS (1990); Garnett, supra note 14; Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social 
Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 367–73 (1997).  
 25 For a look at order maintenance in the context of land use law, see GARNETT, supra note 24; Garnett, 
supra note 14. 
 26 WILLIAM BRATTON WITH PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND: HOW AMERICA’S TOP COP REVERSED THE 
CRIME EPIDEMIC (1998); GIULIANI, supra note 14, at 47 (“‘Sweat the small stuff’ is the essence of the Broken 
Window theory that I embraced to fight crime.”); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME 
DECLINE 36–37 (2007) (noting that scholarly claims about the effectiveness of order maintenance policing in 
reducing crime came largely after the search for causes of actual crime declines began). For an empirical 
challenge to the case that order-maintenance policing effectively reduces crime, see Bernard E. Harcourt & 
Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 271 (2006). 
KELLY GALLEYSPROOFS 11/24/2014 3:23 PM 
2024 EMORY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 64: 2017 
 
As order-maintenance activity extends beyond responses to minor malum 
prohibitum crimes to local legal efforts to prevent nuisances, an unexamined 
conception of order becomes even more problematic. Nicole Garnett, a scholar 
of the order-maintenance movement, has examined local economic regulation 
and land use policies as attempts to suppress and relocate disorder.27 Citing 
Jane Jacobs’ critique of the segregation of commercial and residential uses that 
characterizes Euclidean zoning, Garnett observes that ham-fisted attempts to 
impose a promulgated sense of order frequently have the effect of destroying 
the order fostered organically by the interplay of various activities.28 
Order, as formulated by the most ardent of BWT supporters, tends to focus 
on the immediate fact of rule abidance without much attention to an adherent’s 
motivation for following or disregarding a rule, much less the role that the 
perceived legitimacy of the rule plays in it being observed or ignored. Rules 
are rules because they have been actually promulgated by those with the 
authority to issue them as evidenced by the power that they have to enforce 
them.29 Dan Kahan in his analysis of influencing rule abidance through social 
meaning leaves behind this hard positivist conception of legally induced order 
by examining rule enforcement’s ability to express social norms and to 
encourage members of the community to internalize them.30 But, even this 
incorporationist approach to law as expressing social norms looks past the 
substantive legitimacy of the rules imposed and the constitutional validity of 
both the rules and those who enforce them.31 
If the subject of study were confined to the prevention of serious crimes, 
then order-maintenance researchers would have good cause both to presume 
rule legitimacy and to maintain that any related abuse of authority presents a 
wholly distinct research question. But, as order-maintenance theorists such as 
 
 27 See GARNETT, supra note 24. 
 28 Id. at 51 (citing JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961)). For an 
analogous discussion of police displacement of less artificial sources of order, see Garnett, supra note 14, at 
40–41 (discussing “depolicing” as a means of making room for community-based methods of rule enforcement 
and conflict resolution). 
 29 This more unreflective use of “order” as compliance with actual rules echoes John Austin’s theory of 
legal positivism, in which the criterion for classifying a norm as law is limited to the social fact of 
promulgation by a functioning sovereign. 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 34–36 (Robert 
Campbell ed., 5th ed. rev. 1885). 
 30 Kahan, supra note 24, at 362–63. 
 31 For a postmodernist approach to this line of criticism, see Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the 
Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and 
Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 368–71 (1998). 
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Garnett have recognized, order maintenance involves discouraging, 
suppressing, and displacing a wide range of activity deemed to be disorderly.32 
Police abuse of discretion, racial discrimination, and the unintended 
consequences of interference with liberty all become central questions as 
attention expands to low-level crime enforcement and nuisance prevention.33 
Narrow conceptions of “order” do not eliminate the need to consider the 
accountability of rule makers and rule enforcers. They merely prevent their 
inclusion in many order-maintenance research programs. 
Crime rates can be an important metric of the current state of social order 
and compliance with rules. But, a social influence theorist such as Kahan also 
clearly values information about the attitudes and motivations of those who 
comply and those who fail to comply with rules because these data indicate to 
some extent the stability of social order and the intractability of disorder.34 As 
important as it may be to show that a state of order is backed not merely by 
effective coercion but also by a populace’s internalization of legal norms, 
order-maintenance researchers would not claim that testing underlying 
attitudes constitutes an examination of social order itself. The concept of order 
is itself too shallow and immediate, too sharply focused on actual compliance 
with actual rules, to accommodate what Hart called law’s “internal aspect.”35 
By putting forth “rule of law” in place of “order,” White, Sepe, and Masconale 
offer a deeper, more long-term, and more balanced understanding of rule 
abidance. 
Rule of law implies not only the existence of rules that are socially relevant 
because they are enforced but also four interrelated factors necessary to the 
basic functioning of a legal system. First, for rule of law to obtain, neither the 
rules themselves nor their application can be arbitrary. White, Sepe, and 
 
 32 Garnett, supra note 14, at 7–23 (discussing governmental responses to street disturbances, abandoned 
buildings as well as conflicts among competing types of land uses). 
 33 Id. at 23–26 (discussing urban renewal as heavy-handed blight elimination); Harcourt, supra note 31, 
at 377–84 (documenting rise of police abuse complaints during the move to order-maintenance policing). 
 34 See Kahan, supra note 24, at 351. 
 35 H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 56–57, 88–91 (3d ed. 2012). According to Hart, laws, although 
commands backed by coercive threat, are distinct from orders given by and backed by the threat of a gunman 
in a bank in that they are generally recognized by citizens as being promulgated with official authority and this 
recognition as law can be a reason for compliance apart from fear of official enforcement activity. Id. at 82–86. 
Hart’s embrace of what he calls the internal point of view distinguishes his approach to legal positivism from 
that of John Austin. 
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Masconale endorse this criterion by contrasting “rule of law” with “rule of 
men.”36  
Second, persons having legal authority cannot themselves be completely 
unconstrained by the law in either their personal or official capacities. Related 
to the rejection of arbitrariness, this principle shows that law is not merely a 
one-way accountability relationship between sovereign and subject. Instead, 
rule of law measurements involve the prevalence of appropriate constraints on 
authority as well as on the general citizenry. White, Sepe, and Masconale 
explicitly recognize this aspect of rule of law as essential to supporting the 
pactum subjectionis, the vertical aspect of the social contract.37 Their 
understanding of rule of law as a two-way street comes through in the 
conception of rule of law that they explicitly adopt. For the authors, rule of law 
is an equilibrium between “‘social cooperation’ (rule abidance) and ‘social 
advocacy’ (taking actions to hold both fellow citizens and public officials 
accountable to the law).”38 
Third, the law must have some social relevance in that it is regularly 
enforced by those in authority and recognized as law by those subject to it. 
This facet illustrates the great overlap between rule of law and order even as it 
also expresses the former’s internal aspect. 
Fourth, and more controversially for those committed to some form of legal 
positivism, rule of law requires that the law, as written and as applied, has 
some basic orientation to the public good, even if this requirement yields few 
indispensable procedural rights and no substantive rights. Lon Fuller and 
Jeremy Waldron have each argued that the procedural guarantees associated 
with rule of law express a necessary respect for self-determination and human 
dignity.39 Joseph Raz has resisted importation of moral norms into the 
definition of law. For him rule of law is analogous to the sharpness of a knife; 
instead of slicing, law guides individual behavior. But, rule of law, as a 
normative concept, is limited to this instrumental purpose.40 Most of these 
 
 36 White et al., supra note 3, at 9–10. 
 37 Id. at 11–12. 
 38 Id. at 7 (citing Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, Microfoundations of the Rule of Law, 17 
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 21, 23 (2014)). 
 39 See Colleen Murphy, Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law, 24 LAW & PHIL. 239, 250 
(2005) (citing LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964)); Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the 
Importance of Procedure, in GETTING TO THE RULE OF LAW 3 (James E. Fleming ed., 2011). 
 40 Murphy, supra note 39, at 247–48 (citing and quoting JOSEPH RAZ, AUTHORITY OF LAW 226 (1979)). 
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debates focus on what qualifies certain procedural and substantive rules as law. 
Rule of law, on the other hand, is a characteristic of an entire legal system. A 
legal system may be made up of laws, most of which are just and others of 
which are unjust, perhaps some even extremely so. The debate about the role 
of justness in the definition of law comes into play both in determining 
whether identified rules qualify as law and in judging if, and to what extent, 
the presence of injustice in a legal system vitiates rule of law as a whole. 
In these last two criteria for rule of law, we see more clearly how the 
concept of “rule of law” straddles the borderline between positive and 
normative, between fact and value, between actual and ideal.41 Even my 
summary above minimizes the extent to which the category known as “rule of 
law” is disputed. White, Sepe, and Masconale note the range of conceptions of 
rule of law and the relevance of the controversy in an extended footnote that 
does not itself state the authors’ allegiance.42 Their empirical project does 
suggest, however that they believe it is possible to measure rule of law through 
opinion surveys, a belief which may preclude a central role for substantive 
moral factors. 
Given that research paradigms with significant normative content can 
upend quantitative empirical studies, which depend upon quantifiable facts and 
stated perceptions as data points, White, Sepe, and Masconale are 
understandably reticent about embracing the normative aspects of rule of law. 
Despairing of the possibility of objective criteria delineating rule legitimacy, 
empirical researchers tend to report majoritarian perceptions of legitimacy. 
But, by redefining the core policy goal from order to a deeper, more 
sustainable sense of social stability, White, Sepe, and Masconale give us a 
richer but no less grounded metric for appraising the health of the social 
contract. 
B. Public Goods 
As a theory proposing a policy lever that can bring about, or at least help 
bring about, an improved state of affairs, UDT has as its central concern, its 
independent variable, urban infrastructure. As important as the authors’ 
introduction of the concept of rule of law to the domestic urban policy 
 
 41 See Gülriz Uygur, The Rule of Law: Is the Line between the Formal and the Moral Blurred?, in LAW, 
LIBERTY, AND THE RULE OF LAW 103 (Imer B. Flores & Kenneth E. Himma eds., 2013). 
 42 White et al., supra note 3, at 9 n.31. 
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discussion is, sustained investment in a certain set of urban public goods is 
their proposed solution. Their social insurance policy proposal ultimately rests 
upon a proper understanding of which goods should be guaranteed funding. 
In this section, I will examine what kinds of goods qualify as “urban 
infrastructure” and what, if any, affect does the government’s role with respect 
to those goods have on their inclusion on that list. The section will begin with a 
survey of how public and private goods differ in the way that they are 
consumed and how those differences shape our general understanding of 
infrastructure. Looking at the explicit and implicit requirements of UDT 
theory, I will critique the urban infrastructure list provided by the authors and 
determine which public goods are most likely to perform the signaling function 
that is the core of the theory. As a list of public goods that “play[] an especially 
salient role in underpinning the rule of law,”43 the authors urban infrastructure 
categorization is both overinclusive and underinclusive; but, the article’s more 
significant shortcoming stems from its failure to examine the government’s 
role in revenue collection as part and parcel of its public goods resource 
management function. 
Purely private goods tend to be both excludable and rivalrous. A good is 
excludable to the extent that its supplier can legally and cost effectively control 
its consumption. The consumption of a rivalrous good by any user directly 
reduces the consumption opportunities of other consumers.44 Public goods 
typically are, at least to some degree, non-excludable, non-rivalrous, or both.45 
Even when the suppliers of public goods can exclude consumers at a feasible 
cost, infrastructure goods are generally offered on a common carrier basis, 
available to all consumers without discrimination as to the user or the use.46 
This open access is often legally mandated because infrastructure goods are 
essential to the consumption or production of other goods.47 When a public 
good is at least partially rivalrous, either the government or a private utility 
bears the responsibility of maintaining sufficient capacity, which is often 
 
 43  Id. at 9. 
 44 Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. 
REV. 917, 942 (2005). 
 45 Id. at 935 n.62. 
 46 Id. at 936–37. 
 47 Id. at 926–27. 
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accomplished through user fees when the good is also at least partially 
excludable.48 
Because the UDT theory states that rule of law is affected by public goods 
investment through that investment’s signaling function, a proper description 
of urban infrastructure will include those public goods for which the 
government bears sufficient responsibility as to be credited or blamed for their 
condition. In cataloguing public goods that qualify as urban infrastructure, 
Urban Decay provides the following non-exhaustive list: “roads and highways, 
electrical supply, water resources, air quality, public transportation systems, 
traffic control, safe travel, and a pleasing overall aesthetic.”49 The authors 
describe public goods more generally as consisting of “essential goods and 
services . . . that individuals fail to supply . . . [including] a country’s internal 
and external security, health care, education and—most importantly for the 
purposes of this Article—urban infrastructure.”50 The authors claim that 
suppliers of these goods lack the power to exclude “free riders who [do] not 
contribute to their production.”51 
The authors struggle in their attempts to privilege capital-intensive goods 
that shape the built environment of the city over other essential goods and 
services such as “internal and external security, health care, [and] education.”52 
The authors argue, without success, that the benefits associated with the former 
set “provide a signal to individuals about the legitimacy and stability of legal 
rules, as well as the polity’s shared commitment to abide by law.”53 Certainly 
the benefits the authors list—“allowing people and goods to move 
efficiently,”54 “preventing the spread of diseases,”55 and “decreasing the 
likelihood of accidents”56—do not differ in kind from the benefits associated 
with hospitals, health clinics, and, most importantly, police protection. The 
authors contend that the signaling function is performed best by those goods 
 
 48 Id. at 954. 
 49 White et al., supra note 3, at 19. In the associated footnote, the authors also add “sanitary systems, 
public facilities (e.g., libraries) and parks” but leave these off the primary list because they fall outside the data 
set they obtained for the empirical section of the article. Id. at 19 n.67. 
 50 Id. at 12. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 20.  
 54 Id. at 19. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
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that “directly and inescapably affect[] the daily lived experience of all 
citizens.”57 Even if elementary and secondary education services do not 
directly impact every local household, few public goods are given more 
attention by homebuyers and homeowners, irrespective of their own need for 
them.58 The authors’ urban infrastructure requirement that the quality of 
included public goods be of the type that are constantly and directly monitored 
by citizen–consumers has intuitive appeal. This element of the argument would 
seem to exclude zoning, subdivision platting, and other long-term planning 
controls as public goods that signal effectively, but it does nothing to push 
aside education, health care and, particularly, public safety. As discussed 
below, the authors are keen to present public goods investment as an 
alternative to government’s coercive activity, but rule enforcement is an 
essential public service the administration of which reflects on governmental 
competence.59 The authors provide no principled reason for excluding these 
enforcement services from other vital public safety services such as snow 
plowing and emergency fire response, which would presumably be included in 
urban infrastructure. 
In describing the ways in which adequate provision of these goods affects 
public confidence, the authors ignore both the fact that many of these public 
goods are not directly provided by governmental entities and the possibility 
that the level of taxation required of citizens to fund certain goods might 
influence their satisfaction with them. About 70% of Americans receive their 
electricity from for-profit utilities.60 Is the fact that these private businesses are 
subject to extensive public regulation a sufficient governmental nexus to have 
the quality of their services signal to their users the health of the social 
contract? It seems unlikely. Each utility company generally provides only one 
particular public good. Its ineffectiveness or even insolvency does not 
necessarily signal anything about the overall stability of the social contract, no 
 
 57 Id. 
 58 WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 40–51, 148–50 (2001) (noting the value 
of strong school performance, among other public goods controlled by local governments, is capitalized into 
local land values). 
 59 The relevance of housing and building code enforcement to the authors’ understanding of urban 
infrastructure is implicit in their references to the problem of privately owned abandoned buildings in Detroit. 
See White et al., supra note 3, at 3, 21. 
 60 Diane Cardwell, Power to the People: More Cities Weigh Taking Electricity Business From Private 
Utilities, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2013 at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/business/energy-
environment/cities-weigh-taking-electricity-business-from-private-utilities.html. 
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matter how essential electricity is to daily life. Those goods that are neither 
actually delivered by local government nor truly non-excludable because their 
consumption depends on payment of a substantial user fee should not be held 
up as accomplishing the signaling function. 
With private utility goods and services put to the side then, our attention 
turns to those goods and services funded by tax dollars. If citizens’ feelings 
about taxation affect their satisfaction with public goods, then adequacy of 
funding for these aspects of urban infrastructure can no longer completely 
account for the signaling function that shapes citizen confidence. 
Perhaps the authors could advance arguments that minimize the impact that 
local tax burdens have on residents’ assessment of the quality of essential 
public goods and services. The focus on the “daily lived experience”61 as the 
frame in which citizens make the connection between the sufficiency of public 
goods and the stability of social cooperation would seem to marginalize tax 
rate considerations as much as it did long-term planning functions. If this is 
correct, then citizens might focus only on the outcomes from government 
goods and services without respect to how heavily they are taxed to achieve 
those results. But, this assertion seems implausible on its face, at least at 
certain levels of taxation. Consumers of all kind are price sensitive. It is 
difficult to imagine any citizen whose evaluation of one or more public goods 
would not be affected by the cost imposed on her for those goods. 
A somewhat more promising line of argument stems from the authors’ 
observation that the cities with the most degraded urban infrastructure often 
have the higher tax rates than the well-appointed suburbs that surround them.62 
If better infrastructure does not translate into higher taxes, the argument might 
run, that perhaps dissatisfaction with tax rates should not be looked at as 
tempering the ability of infrastructure quality to signal effective government. 
But, the stark contrast between the fiscal situations of the inner city and the 
suburb does not counter the intuition that better infrastructure costs more and 
does not address the still open question of whether or not it is adequacy or 
efficiency in the delivery of public goods that inspires confidence in citizens. 
 
 61 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 62 White et al., supra note 3, at 49. The authors do not discuss how this counterintuitive state of affairs 
came to be, although I will in this essay’s final section. See infra notes 79–93 and accompanying text. 
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In any attempt to establish a connection between municipal public goods 
and rule of law, local tax burdens should not be ignored. The root observation 
of the scholarly work of Wallace Oates and Charles Tiebout, both cited in the 
Urban Decay article, is that the ease with which residents move from one local 
taxing jurisdiction to another, often without changing jobs, makes resident 
sensitivity to taxes a more central issue at the municipal level than at the state 
or federal levels.63 Even with adequate public goods, overtaxed citizens will 
vote with their feet. Those who stay may be no less law abiding than those who 
leave. Even if their departure, however, has little obvious effect on the social 
cooperation aspect of rule of law, its impact on social advocacy will be felt, if 
only because they were the ones more willing to hold local officials 
accountable.64 With the use of exit, communities also lose voice. 
C. Urban Decay Theory v. Broken Windows Theory 
The authors do not tout rule of law as a true alternative to order, nor do 
they acknowledge any overlap between provision for public safety and urban 
infrastructure. Both of these apparent omissions are understandable in light of 
the authors’ desire to place UDT in competition with BWT. For UDT to truly 
displace BWT, it must address largely the same dependent variable as BWT 
does: rule abidance. At the same time, UDT must introduce a clearly distinct 
independent variable as the new protagonist. Rule of law, as a concept, does 
encompass the preservation of social order that is the focus of BWT. If the 
Urban Decay article, however, had devoted a significant amount of space to 
discussing why rule of law was preferable to order maintenance as a goal, 
readers might come away with the impression that BWT and UDT address 
quite distinct problems. To my mind, UDT clearly addresses the same problem 
as BWT, but in a deeper and a more comprehensive way. 
Ironically, the real concern for the proponents of UDT is not any 
subject-matter disconnect with BWT but a strong overlap between BWT’s 
independent variable (unaddressed, low-level physical and social disorder) and 
UDT’s independent variable (investment in urban infrastructure). As I have 
argued above, there is no principled reason to exclude rule enforcement 
infrastructure from the types of public goods by which citizens judge the health 
 
 63 See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM (1972); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local 
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
 64 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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of the social contract. But, if UDT involves urban residents making rule 
abidance decisions based on a perceived lack of governmental commitment to 
rule enforcement then UDT seems to be little more than an expanded version 
of BWT rather than a rival to it. White, Sepe, and Masconale might respond by 
claiming that the mechanism connecting public safety spending and rule 
abidance is different in each case. With respect to public goods, UDT stresses 
the levels of sustained investment, the quality of the outcomes, or both of these 
elements as the signals to which citizens are attuned. With BWT, it is the 
absence of the coercive threat, which physical disorder and unchecked social 
disorder are communicating. But, if perception of law enforcement is a 
common denominator between the two, the nuance of UDT’s emphasis on 
social cooperation and BWT’s focus on coercive capacity may be lost on 
policy makers who hear from both sides that putting more cops on the street 
will get the job done.  
Ultimately, White, Sepe, and Masconale struggle in their attempt to make a 
purely theoretical case for increased investment in one sort of public goods, 
urban infrastructure, to the cost of another, increased police presence. Of 
course, a well-designed, compelling study contrasting these two types of 
investments might accomplish that task more effectively than even the most 
clearly articulated conceptual analysis. 
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
To establish an empirical case for their assertion that the adequacy of urban 
infrastructure funding predicts rule of law, the authors perform regression 
analyses on four sets of data. Traffic death statistics and citizen satisfaction 
surveys are combined to form URBAN, an independent variable indexing public 
goods.65 As noted above, the dependent variable, rule of law, is represented by 
the Corruption Perception Index (CPI).66 Last, the authors bring in an 
instrumental variable, the significance of which will be explained presently, to 
confirm the conclusions of specific prediction provisionally indicated by the 
correlations established between the independent and dependent variables data 
sets. This instrumental variable, labeled by the authors UNESCO, indicates the 
number of world heritage sites in each location.67 The data sets were gathered 
 
 65 White et al., supra note 3, at 33–34. 
 66 Id. at 34–35; see also supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text. 
 67 Id. at 41. 
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from nations all over the globe and it appears that the data for each country is 
taken from that country as a whole. An obvious objection to the use of data 
sets from foreign countries is that they do not speak to the experience of U.S. 
residents. But, if they succeed in demonstrating that public goods investment 
predicts rule of law in many different countries, the burden would be on those 
rejecting the evidence to show why the American experience of social contract 
requires exclusively domestic data. 
The more troubling disconnect lies between the authors’ use of 
countrywide data to establish the connection between austerity and decay, and 
their focus on municipalities as the political communities within which that 
connection plays out. If the city is the locus of UDT, then UDT would be more 
convincingly established by comparing the experiences of many different 
cities. If my assumption about the data being collected across the whole of 
each country is wrong and the resident satisfaction results are actually confined 
to urban residents, then the traffic death data and the corruption survey results 
should be similarly limited. If all the data is confined to urban areas, then the 
various urban areas should be the points of comparison not the nations. 
Still, the authors are quite clear that they work with the data that they have, 
not the data they wish they had. To establish that public goods investment 
specifically predicts rule of law, the authors would prefer to have panel data, 
sets of these measurements collected at different points in time.68 In the 
absence of such longitudinal evidence, the authors resort to a two-stage least 
squares regression in which their initial results are mediated through an 
instrumental variable.69 If an instrumental variable that correlates to the 
independent variable but does not correlate to the dependent variable is 
selected, a correlation between both the instrumental and independent 
variables, on the one hand, and the dependent variable, on the other hand, can 
show that the original correlation between the independent and dependent 
variable does not result either from happenstance or from the “dependent” 
variable inducing a response in the “independent” variable (i.e., reverse 
causation).70 
 
 68 Id. at 40. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 40 nn.172 & 174 (citing, inter alia, Lubimor P. Litov, Simone M. Sepe & Charles K. Whitehead, 
Lawyers and Fools: Lawyer-Directors in Public Corporations, 102 GEO. L.J. 413, 436–38 (2014)).  
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After conducting the second stage regression analysis, they conclude 
“(1) that the quality of urban infrastructure has a measurable impact on the rule 
of law, (2) that a higher quality urban infrastructure causes a country to have a 
strengthened rule of law, and (3) that a weaker urban infrastructure leads to a 
weakened rule of law.”71 Even after reading through the complex statistical 
arguments the authors offer in support of UDT, I was unable to determine if 
the authors viewed adequate investment in public goods as a necessary 
condition for rule of law, a sufficient condition, both, or neither. Even if the 
answer is neither, I would still want to know how significant a causal factor 
infrastructure investment is. Perhaps, the numerical answer was right there in 
front of me as I read, but I need more help to understand it. The authors’ stated 
finding of “a measurable impact” is generally insufficient to support major 
changes in fiscal structure, especially if UDT is going to challenge BWT when 
the latter’s order-maintenance policing is taking credit for declining crime rates 
across the nation. 
III.  THE PUBLIC POLICY PAYOFF 
The authors identify signaling public goods with urban infrastructure in 
both the conceptual and empirical sections in order to build the case for their 
proposed solution to what they see as the unmitigated disaster that is Detroit’s 
bankruptcy. To balance the need for the sustained infrastructure so significant 
to rule of law with the need for local accountability, the article offers partial 
government insurance as a compromise solution. State and federal statutes 
would be enacted to backstop municipal finances and assure “the uninterrupted 
operation of quality municipal services.”72 The authors offer no evidence that 
the actual default on Detroit’s obligations to its creditors drastically curtailed 
essential goods and services that had been in a deplorable condition for years.73 
They also do not specify the level of fiscal distress that would trigger this 
matching funds approach to municipal bailout. Given the breadth of UDT as a 
theory about the relationship between the strength of the government as a 
 
 71 Id. at 42–43. 
 72 Id. at 55. 
 73 Part of the Bankruptcy Court’s charge in handling a municipal petition is to make sure that vital 
services continue on uninterrupted. In re Addison Cmty. Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. 646, 648 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
1994) (“Because the purpose of municipalities (i.e. police protection, fire protection, sewage, garbage removal, 
schools, hospitals) is to provide essential services to residents, it is crucial that chapter 9 relief allow these 
entities enough flexibility to remain viable.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4115, 4116)). 
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coordinator of public goods and the degree of positive citizen engagement with 
the legal rules that delineate the social contract, it is surprising and 
disappointing to have UDT’s policy payoff be more lucrative for municipal 
creditors than beneficial to inner-city residents looking for sustained growth 
that does not push them aside. The authors’ focus on Detroit’s bankruptcy and 
the preceding refusal of the State of Michigan to guarantee its debts seems to 
have shaped their application of UDT to contemporary urban affairs. While it 
is undeniable that the fiscal insolvency of one of America’s largest cities is a 
scandal, it is one that has a long, if not unique, history, in which state-level 
austerity policies play only a small role. 
In discussing Tieboutian sorting, the process by which residents of a 
metropolitan area seek the best public goods bargain for themselves by 
relocating to the most favorable jurisdiction accessible to them, White, Sepe, 
and Masconale close in on the true cause of urban fiscal distress. Neither of the 
arguments that the authors advance against fiscal decentralization, however, 
meet the core Tieboutian/fiscal federalist contention that jurisdictional 
fragmentation in the provision of metropolitan public goods is as natural as it is 
efficient. Taking them in reverse order, the authors’ second argument against 
decentralization is based on its incompatibility with UDT.74 If sustained 
investment in public goods is essential to rule of law, then it is 
counterproductive to isolate financially the governmental bodies responsible 
for that investment.75 Here, however, the authors’ lack of clarity about the 
extent to which public goods investment determines rule of law prevents any 
strong showing that the lack of a fiscal safety net is fundamentally 
destabilizing to rule of law at the local level. 
Their first argument offered for social insurance is that municipal finances 
need to be backstopped through recessions.76 Keynesians contend that the 
public fisc should stand prepared to spend greater amounts of money precisely 
at those times when economic downturns bring revenues up short.77 This 
macroeconomic line of reasoning is very relevant to state-level debates of 
constitutional balanced budget requirements and “rainy day” funds generally. 
Perhaps, it may even convince some fiscal decentralists to rein in their 
 
 74 White et al., supra note 3, at 51. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 48. 
 77 Id. at 48 n.208 (citing, inter alia, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, Notes on the Trade Cycle, in THE GENERAL 
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 313 (Macmillan Press Ltd. 1973) (1936)). 
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concerns about moral hazard and agree to some form of cross-jurisdictional 
insurance to facilitate counter-cyclical deficit spending when needed. But, the 
chronic inability of residents of legacy cities, such as Detroit, to expect even 
the most basic public goods has very little to do with the vagaries of the 
business cycle. City budget crises do get worse when the economy slows. It 
was no coincidence that Detroit’s insolvency reached a point of no return 
during the Great Recession and so soon after the near collapse of General 
Motors and Chrysler. But, for the reasons described below, Detroit’s 
fundamental fiscal reality has been desperate for decades and its trajectory 
towards that desperation began decades earlier.78 
As William Fischel points out in his book, The Homevoter Hypothesis, the 
development of suburbs around America’s cities late in the nineteenth century 
gave no early sign of an inexorable march toward fragmentation and the fiscal 
isolation of the city center.79 Suburbs formed, but they also combined with 
other suburbs and the larger city because of the efficiencies that such mergers 
and annexations allowed.80 As long as real estate development investment 
flowed unimpeded across jurisdictional lines, suburbs found no irresistible 
advantage in preserving their autonomy.81 But, when a Supreme Court that had 
been largely suspicious of economic regulation unexpectedly upheld local 
zoning authority in its 1926 decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 
local governments were given the power to tailor the quality and per-household 
cost of the public goods they offered their residents.82 By being able to set 
large minimum-lot sizes for new houses and effectively ban apartment 
buildings, which were portrayed in the Euclid opinion as parasites on 
single-family homes, suburban governments could effectively guarantee their 
residents that they would be choosing and funding public goods only with 
fellow residents who had a substantially similar socioeconomic status.83 With 
the power of fiscal zoning, local voters recognized the extent to which their 
 
 78 See Joel Kurth, Mike Wilkinson & Louis Aguilar, Six Decades–How Abandonment, Racial Tensions 
and Financial Missteps Bankrupted an Iconic American City, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 4, 2013, at S8, available at 
http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20131004/METRO01/310040001. 
 79 FISCHEL, supra note 58, at 209–13. 
 80 Id. at 209–11. 
 81 Id. 
 82 272 U.S. 365, 386–89 (1926). 
 83 Fischel credits the scholarship of Bruce Hamilton for explaining the important role of exclusionary 
zoning in preventing Tieboutian sorting becoming a futile game of the poor chasing after the affluent in order 
to enjoy higher quality public goods. FISCHEL, supra note 58, at 65–69 (citing Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and 
Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12 URB. STUD. 205 (1975)).  
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property taxes were investments in public goods that in turn strongly 
determined their land values and jealously guarded their ability to control both 
land use and public goods funding, especially school finance.84 Fischel’s 
account of the legal facilitation of, what Robert Reich has called, the secession 
of the successful,85 however, omits its worst chapter: the part that racial 
discrimination played in the genesis of the modern American suburb. 
The role of race in the creation of the suburb goes at least as far back as the 
Supreme Court’s validation of zoning in Euclid, which was issued as the Great 
Migration was reaching its peak.86 As the federal government began to 
facilitate mortgage lending to homebuyers looking to take advantage of 
transportation advances, the Federal Housing Administration drew up maps of 
areas at risk of racial change and refused to support loans to those areas.87 
Moreover, the agency encouraged the use of racially restrictive covenants 
before and after the U.S. Supreme Court found their enforcement to be 
unconstitutional.88 Despite the racial discrimination in the founding of the 
suburbs, the Court refused to enforce the school desegregation mandate in 
Brown against suburbs that had no history of de jure discrimination in 
education.89 
White, Sepe, and Masconale ultimately respond to those who praise 
Tieboutian sorting by pointing out the apparent futility of resident mobility in 
the absence of the authors’ proposed fiscal safety net: “Having lived in one 
municipality that has been ignored by the mass of people—as embodied by the 
state or federal government—how can one have faith that the next municipality 
won’t suffer the same fate?”90 The question that the authors pose is rhetorical, 
 
 84 Id. 
 85 See Robert B. Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at A16, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/20/magazine/secession-of-the-successful.html. 
 86 Richard H. Chused, Euclid’s Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 606–07 (2001). Years 
earlier, the Court had invalidated ordinances that blocked acquisition of property by African-Americans in 
certain designated areas, not because they violated equal protection but because they interfered with the 
property rights of would-be sellers. Id. 
 87 See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & SALLY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE 
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 51 (1993). 
 88 See id. at 50; see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1948). William Julius Wilson has 
argued that the elimination of discriminatory housing barriers, such as racially restrictive covenants, induced 
working-class and middle-class African-American residents to flee declining inner-city neighborhoods 
exacerbating concentration of poverty in those neighborhoods. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY 
DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 7–8 (2d ed. 2012).  
 89 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752–53 (1974). 
 90 White et al., supra note 3, at 51. 
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but, after the review of fiscal zoning, race-based mortgage facilitation, and the 
near elimination of interdistrict school desegregation, the answer is apparent: 
Long before the advent of the gated community, America built communities 
with invisible walls and no gates at all. 
Judging from the rhetorical question they pose, White, Sepe, and 
Masconale seem to see Detroit as a city that has lost out to other large cities 
rather than a city that watched its tax base relocate to nearby Oakland County. 
In reality, Detroit is merely the most extreme example of the fate that has 
befallen many postindustrial cities in the United States due to massive “white 
flight” to the surrounding suburbs.91 Tieboutian sorting among different 
metropolitan areas is not only possible but an increasingly relevant reality. But, 
even those observing this phenomenon note that the conventional Tieboutian 
model is entirely focused on movement within a metropolitan area.92 Starting 
in the 1950s, the construction of highways and housing projects under the 
banner of urban renewal as well as the ensuing riots and proliferation of 
narcotics dealing produced violent and undercrowded inner-city neighborhoods 
in many similarly situated cities.93 But, even if the authors of Urban Decay 
have missed Detroit’s departing tax base as the central cause of its lack of 
fiscal viability, the UDT theory and its focus on rule of law open up new 
avenues to understanding and addressing the barriers to a more just, more 
peaceful and more prosperous metropolitan community. 
CONCLUSION 
Through a deeper inquiry into the signaling effects of the funding as well as 
of the delivery of local public goods, the UDT approach can establish a 
sturdier critique of the shortsightedness of both fiscal decentralization and the 
 
 91 In the so-called Rust Belt, the contrast in the fiscal fortunes of urban and suburban areas is somewhat 
lessened because of the unrelenting blows that decades of deindustrialization have delivered to the economies 
of entire metropolitan regions. See EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY: HOW OUR GREATEST 
INVENTION MAKES US RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER, AND HAPPIER 41–67 (2011). 
 92 Nestor M. Davidson & Sheila R. Foster, The Mobility Case for Regionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
63, 65–66 (2013) (“On the demand side of Tiebout’s metaphorical marketplace, people choose among 
residential options in a given metropolitan area by evaluating the bundle of public goods offered at the local 
level. Correspondingly, the type of government the model contemplates to supply this targeted bundle is 
paradigmatically a local government of general jurisdiction. In short, Tieboutian localism depends on local 
governments competing for mobile residents in a defined metro area.” (footnote omitted)). 
 93 It is little wonder that the increasingly common electoral victory by an African-American candidate 
running for citywide office was observed by one legal scholar to be the winning of a “hollow prize.” See 
HAROLD A. MCDOUGALL, BLACK BALTIMORE: A NEW THEORY OF COMMUNITY 91–112 (1993). 
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urban pacification strategies of order-maintenance policing. With the inclusion 
of vital local public goods such as primary and secondary education, 
researchers exploring the causal link at the core of UDT can examine the 
resident experience of public goods not just as a type of consumer satisfaction, 
but also as a constitutive element of the citizen experience of the social 
contract. City residents perceive not only the desperate inadequacy of these 
public goods but also the inequity behind it. Inner-city youth that are sent to 
failing schools do not merely worry about the soundness of the overall social 
contract, they doubt very much that they are party to it at all. The application 
of order-maintenance policing in inner-city high schools has created a 
school-to-prison pipeline that marginalizes all students enrolled not just those 
incarcerated. Abstract analysis will not tell us who is affected or how, but 
empirical research, qualitative as well as quantitative, may help sort out 
whether the expressive potential of “zero tolerance” policies are helping 
students internalize pro-social norms or contributing to a message that they are 
to be contained rather than included. If the study of signaling public goods is 
not artificially narrowed to serve a particular policy recommendation, the UDT 
approach to urban affairs can foster a more complete understanding of how 
government services shape citizen interaction with authority. The endeavor to 
identify those inputs that will produce the desired social outcome frequently, 
and understandably, overshadows any effort to understand fully the end itself. 
But, by positing rule of law as UDT’s objective, White, Sepe, and Masconale 
have laid a broader foundation for discussion of possible paths to a sustainably 
safe and sound metropolitan environment. 
A robust conception of the rule of law can allow researchers interested in 
minority perspectives to move beyond a myopic focus on crime rates. In 2001, 
the City of Cincinnati experienced weeks of rioting triggered by a police 
shooting but attributed to the pent-up frustration with violently aggressive 
police tactics in dealing with African-American residents.94 More recently, the 
St. Louis suburb of Ferguson, Missouri experienced similar unrest that local 
officials acknowledged stemmed in part from the repeated imposition of harsh 
fines on low-level African-American offenders.95 Empirical inquiries into rule 
 
 94 Peter Bronson, Op-Ed., Lessons for Ferguson From Cincinnati’s 2001 Riots, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 
2014, at A11; Jane Prendergast, Changes in Policing, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Apr. 2, 2011, at F4, available at 
http://archive.cincinnati.com/article/20110403/NEWS01/104030306/Changes-policing. 
 95 Megan Davies & Dan Burns, In Riot-Hit Ferguson, Traffic Fines Boost Tension and Budget, REUTERS 
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of law are not limited to the actual instances of massive social unrest. They can 
and should investigate any feelings of alienation and rage that broad segments 
of the population may have towards law enforcement. Where assessments 
focused on order recognize only the resulting violence, researchers measuring 
rule of law can grasp the instability already present before the riot. Any 
research program structured to examine rule abidance from a majoritarian 
perspective cannot reveal the true benefits of investment in a more equitable 
approach to the funding and delivery of vital public goods. Urban Decay opens 
a new perspective on these urban and regional policy issues and should be 
valued as a call for further inquiry into the role of public goods investment in 
the promotion of rule of law in American cities. 
